The present military action in the Gaza Strip has forced me to spend some time evaluating my position and as a result I no longer consider one of those ideas to be a viable possibility.

Not A Solution

The “Two State Solution” is not a solution at all. 

If we as a global society would welcome an endless war then we may continue to advocate this idea, but otherwise, I tell you it will solve nothing.  Even if Israel were to hand over enough land for the Palestinians to have a contiguous territory (an essential condition for my version of the “two state solution” and a condition which Israel does not seem likely to meet voluntarily) there would follow the inevitable border disputes and skirmishes, with lulls and escalations and basically a low-level war for the next several hundred years.

This is unacceptable, and not just from a humanitarian standpoint.  It is also a question of global security:  Until there is peace in Israel-Palestine, there will not be peace in the rest of the world.  Consider that Islamic militant groups around the world cite the conditions in Palestine as one of their chief justifications for whatever atrocity they care to commit.  Such groups will always cite something: but the rallying cry of “Liberate Palestine!” has proved extremely effective and, together with the American-led invasion of Iraq, has certainly aided the process of recruiting large numbers of individuals into extremist militant networks around the world.

The present military operation in Gaza has certainly polarized global sentiment.  Initially, my thought was that some action against Hamas by Israel was justifiable, as was an increased troop presence near the border; both could be explained as deterrents against future rocket attacks.  But I felt my stomach churn when Israel then mounted a ground incursion, with the predictable result that civilian casualties, and the proportion of civilian casualties to the total casualties, have increased significantly.  The ground invasion was a mistake, both in terms of effectiveness as a security strategy and in humanitarian terms.  At this writing the number of civilian casualties has nearly tripled since before ground troops went into Gaza, yet  Hamas rocket attacks against Israeli civilians have not been deterred by the incursion of troops and tanks.

Not by Force of Arms

The conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians will not be resolved by force of arms.  The tit for tat string of retaliations back and forth could carry on endlessly for generations and nothing would be settled.  There must be an international diplomatic solution.

Israel cannot permanently win this conflict through strength.  It is clear that Israel’s military superiority will never win over the hearts and minds of the Palestinians.

The Palestinians cannot win this conflict militarily either.  In fact, it appears that Hamas has no intention of winning this conflict.  Their strategy is to win by losing.  Whether with rockets or suicide bombers, Hamas will keep harassing Israel like a child poking a badger with a stick.  Israel in response will continue to sequester the Palestinian people in their economically deprived slums and occasionally barrage them with retaliatory missile strikes of their own. The Palestinian people, who are on the whole entirely powerless in this situation, consequently feel victimized by the Israelis, so they will teach their children to grow up and hate the Israelis, and as a result of their hatred for Israel, they will support those who fight against Israel, namely Hamas.  Hamas is playing for long-term support and is apparently succeeding.  I will be very surprised if they do not now dominate Gaza politics for generations to come.   It is an endless cycle of violence which empowers a few rogue militant leaders at the expense of world peace.

I do not believe that the Israelis wants to fight an endless war; but they will, if they have no choice.  I do not support all of the Israeli government’s goals and I certainly disagree with many of its actions.  However I believe that the people of Israel would support a peaceful solution, if one could be arranged.

The United Territories of Israel-Palestine

Never has Federalism seemed more appropriate than in the case of Israel-Palestine.

Those who have read the book may recall that I argue against the application of the ideas of Federalism to the development of a future united world government.   Instead I propose a system of global direct democracy.

However, in the specific instance of a hypothetical future Constitutional government of the United Territories of Israel-Palestine (UTIF), a bicameral legislature and a lengthy Bill of Rights would go a long way to secure the future of world peace.  A Senate or upper house with a permanent or very slowly changing apportionment would be able to veto legislation passed by the more representative lower house, thereby assuring that even if Muslims end up outnumbering Jews, the Jewish people would not suffer legislative retaliation at the hands of the newly enfranchised Palestinians.

A Unified, Secular, Constitutional State

I support Israel’s right to exist as a homeland for the Jewish people.  However, I do not support Israel’s right to a specifically Jewish government any more than I support the concept of a religious Caliphate elsewhere in the Middle East, as many proponents of pan-Arab nationalism presently advocate.

Those who have read the book will no doubt vividly recall my strenuous objections to the undue influence which religious groups presently have on the American government.

In order to be provide their citizens with true equality, governments must be secular, neither supporting nor prohibiting any one specific group.

A successful unified state in Israel-Palestine would have to adopt a new Constitution that guaranteed absolute equality for all its citizens through both the government’s structure and also a lengthy Bill of Rights. This is the one and only path to a lasting peace.

The Role of the World

The United Nations has proved singularly ineffective in its attempts to resolve the conflict in Israel-Palestine.  My positions regarding the reform of that world body have been made known, but those are very long-term goals.

It is possible, though hardly desirable, that some form of “world government” may eventually end up being required to step in and impose a truce.  I don’t need to go into detail here about the concept of a global police whose mission is to prevent conflict without supporting one side or another; that has been mentioned in the book and elsewhere on this blog.  Far preferable would be a solution worked out between the people of Palestine and the people of Israel.  In the absence of such a solution, the world must impose one, because surely all reasonable people agree that an endless conflict is simply unacceptable.

In the near term, our priority must be to get the Israelis and the Palestinians to talk to each other, to negotiate, to fight with ideas instead of bullets and explosives.   As Americans, we could have a lot of leverage with the government of Israel, should we choose to use it.  We support them with money and armaments.  We should make our continued support conditional upon their accepting of certain positions and taking certain actions.

Peace in the Middle East will not be easy, but it is possible, and it is essential for the peace of the rest of the world.

Ryan stated that he thought the principle I upheld in my discussion of the situation in Palestine conflicted with the principle which I promoted in my discussion of the situation in Tibet.

In section 3.7.1 Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, I state:

Israel is not going away and it is not going to give back the land it took in the 1957 war, a war which frankly was a defensive action on the part of Israel, a war which the Palestinians helped to instigate, a war which the Palestinians and their allies lost, fair and square.  They need to accept this 60 year old defeat and get over it.

These are strong words.  I do feel sympathetic for the terrible plight of the Palestinian people who have been living in refugee camps for generations.  The situation must be resolved, and at the time when I wrote this I believed that by holding onto false hopes instead of working for real peace the Palestinian leadership was unnecessarily prolong the interminable conflict that has paralyzed the region.

It turns out this argument is somewhat off base and I thank Ryan for calling this to my attention. I misunderstood the issue, and I wholeheartedly apologize to my readers for the error.

In fact the Palestinian position is that they want Israel to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders, and it turns out they have a very good point, because since 1967, Israel has continuously built settlements for its own people on occupied territory in violation of several United Nations resolutions.  (This might be seen as further evidence that the United Nations requires some sharper legal teeth in order for its resolutions to be meaningful.)  I will certainly correct this passage in future editions of the book, and call upon Israel to comply with the UN resolutions, and/or work out a system of compensation and social re-integration for the dislocated populations.

Does this correction resolve Ryan’s concern? Not entirely, I think, for if we are to be honest, what many Palestinians really object to are not so much the 1967 borders or even the recent wall; what they really object to is the 1948 formation of the state of Israel itself; and it is this event which I still think they need to get over. The alternative is endless war. It’s clear the Palestinians have no hope of winning a civil war militarily. Their choice must be either: a. continue to attack soft targets within Israel (restaurants, bus stations, schools) with suicide bombers and rockets for an indefinite, perhaps endless period of time; or b. to renounce violence and try to think of a better way to build their society. Obviously, I call upon the Palestinian leadership to renounce violence.

So by way of contrast, in section 3.2.2.4 China, as part of a broader overview of potential military rivals of the United States, I state that “China has invaded, colonized, and presently holds by force the neighboring country of Tibet.”  I go on in a footnote:

…Tibet was indisputably self-governed from 1912 until the Chinese invasion of 1950.  Since that invasion, the Chinese occupation of Tibet has taken the form of a segregated apartheid society, with the majority ethnic Tibetans subjugated by Chinese settlers…  China’s claim that Tibet is a historical Chinese province ignores the legitimate Tibetan claim to autonomy, and is essentially based on an ancient Mongolian invasion.  …  Empire-building by right of conquest is no longer acceptable…  We reject the rule of empires.  Tibet has a right to independence.

Ryan’s point was essentially this, if he will forgive my paraphrasing:  “In one war, some people lost land, and you’re telling them to get over it; but in a different war, some people lost land and you think they have a right to fight for their independence.  These seem to be conflicting principles.”

The difference in my advice is based on the different circumstances of the two different regions. 

Tibet has been a unified territory for the last 1,400 years.  China is a neighboring empire with its own distinct borders and cultural heritage.  The Chinese invasion of Tibet was a deliberate, organized, military action that took the form of a brutal invasion.  The Chinese settlers who were encouraged by the Chinese government to move to Tibet after the invasion have held the function of maintaining and strengthening China’s rule over Tibet.  These settlers were not a displaced people returning to their homeland:  they were Chinese people settling on land that had been forcibly taken from Tibetan people.

I maintain that this invasion represents an act of aggression by China; and while I would not insist that those Chinese who now live in Tibet must leave, I do believe that China should relinquish political, economic, and military control of Tibet.

In stark contrast to the historical status of the Himalayan Forbidden Kingdom, Palestine has not been an independent unified territory for the two thousand years since the Roman invasion.  Since then, it has traded hands repeatedly, a minor territory of various other empires.  Its present borders were drawn by the French and British at the end of World War I.  At the end of World War II, the British military was in control of Palestine, and they did everything they could to keep the Jews out.  However, large numbers of Jewish people, many of them holocaust survivors, were fleeing Europe and migrating to their ancestral homeland.  This was a large-scale social phenomenon that had been underway, on and off by degrees, for centuries; it was no invasion.   This was not an organized, military conquest; it was the long-term resettlement of a people who had been evicted and dispersed by the Roman army in the second century. 

Eventually the United Nations granted half the territory to the Israelis in the original two-state solution; and Britain grudgingly complied with the mandate, only a few months late.  Israel declared independence, and was promptly attacked by five neighbors in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.  In 1956, Israel participated in a military action against Egypt, and assumed control of the Sinai Peninsula.  1957, Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt under the auspices of the UN.  In 1967, Israel’s neighbors began massing troops near its border in preparation for an invasion; the resulting Six Day War saw Israel capturing more territory.  It is to these “pre-1967 boundaries” which the Palestinians and their supporters demand that Israel should withdraw. They had better be willing and able to offer something pretty good in exchange. How about eternal peace?

In the book, I conclude the Palestine discussion with the proposal of two alternative solutions:  1. a contiguous, fully independent, self-governed state of Palestine; or 2. full Israeli citizenship and democratic equality for all of the Palestinian people, including the Palestinian diaspora currently living as refugees in other countries.

When examined in this light, the principles supporting this argument remain the same:  the principle that all people have the right to freedom and self-governance.  The Tibetans have a right to freedom from Chinese authoritarianism; and they, as well as both the Israelis and the Palestinians, have a right to self-governance. In Tibet, the only popular uprisings since the Chinese invasions have been nonviolent and they have been crushed. I would support a military insurgency in Tibet because this tactic has not yet been tried.  Perhaps after ten or twenty years of terrorist attacks the Tibetan insurgency could break China’s motivation to continue the occupation, or at least force some political reform in the Chinese government.

In Palestine, the people are not so much occupied as they are besieged; clearly an untenable position. Nevertheless, after decades of fighting it should be clear that their military insurgency has already failed, and that this failure is due to the ideological extremism of the movement’s leaders, and therefore it is now time to consider new alternatives.

If the two peoples, the Israelis and the Palestinians, could achieve peace through a unified state that incorporates both peoples, then they will be stronger; but even if they can achieve self-governance only through a functioning two-state solution, then at least that would be a workable solution and much preferable to endless war. 

Also in chapter 3, I propose a general rule of thumb: Any government which is controlled by a country’s military or otherwise ruled by force is by definition not a legitimate government and does not need to be recognized as such by the world community.

Bearing these sentiments in mind, I watched in dismay as, first in Kenya and then in Zimbabwe, violent ethno-political strife was triggered when an opposition party leader apparently won a Presidential election and the ruling party refused to concede. In both cases, neither the African Union nor the United Nations was able to provide effective peacekeeping or conflict resolution.

In Kenya, impartial observers stated there was clear evidence of ballot rigging in the Presidential election held in the last week of December, 2007. The ruling party’s incumbent, Mwai Kibaki, won by a very slight margin; if the election had not been rigged, then presumably the opposition candidate, Raila Odinga, would have won indisputably. The immediate aftermath of the rigged election was a horrible bloodbath that dragged on for two months until the opposing sides eventually agreed to a power-sharing arrangement in the government at the end of February 2008. Former United Nations Secretary-General Khofi Annan did a great thing: he was able to negotiate peace where none seemed possible. Ending the violence was more important than any political outcome, and rightly so.

Unfortunately this set a terrible precedent, for now disgruntled factions in emerging democracies the world over have seen that violence, not the will of the people, may determine the outcome of an election.

Zimbabwe held its own Presidential election on March 29, 2008, just a month after the resolution of the crisis in Kenya. International observers generally agreed that the initial Zimbabwe election was conducted properly; but then the ruling government, headed by President Robert Mugabe, refused to release the election results for more than a month, leading many observers both within and outside the country to believe that the opposition party had probably won, and that Mugabe was stalling so he could rig the results in his own favor. Meanwhile, there were indications that Mugabe had launched a campaign of violent intimidation against opposition candidate Morgan Tsvangirai’s supporters, even before the election results were announced. Eventually Tsvangirai had no choice but to agree to a runoff election; and that is when the full-fledged crimes against humanity began in earnest.

The army and police forces as well as groups of Mugabe’s thugs carried out a brutal campaign of violence against Tsvangirai’s supporters, with systematic beatings, widespread arrests, torture, and politically motivated rape and murder of innocent civilians. By the time the "runoff election" took place, at least 86 Tsvangirai supporters had been murdered (some say the number is closer to 100), about 5,000 people were abducted, and some 200,000 people had been forced from their homes by Mugabe loyalists. In the end, Tsvangirai was forced to withdraw from the election and take refuge in the Dutch embassy to avoid being arrested on charges of treason; "treason" in this case meaning "daring to be the opposition candidate." Though some criticized Tsvangirai’s decision to withdraw, I believe it was the most noble decision he could have made, for although in the end he could not stop the violence, withdrawing from the sham election was at that point the only thing he could do to try to protect his supporters’ lives.

On June 27, Mugabe went ahead and held the runoff election unopposed; and he used the army, police, threats and intimidation to force people to go to the polls and vote for him. Rural voters were warned that failure to vote would cost them benefits or even their farms. Some villagers were driven to the polling stations by the army or by the henchmen of the ruling party. Many voters reported that, far from being a secret ballot, elections workers were writing down the names of everyone who voted, and who they voted for. Members of the opposition party who did make it to the polling places found that their voter registration had been suspended. Meanwhile, reporters for Reuters and al-Jazeera news agencies were arrested. Click here to read more about what a sham the election was.

Months later, the two sides have agreed to hold talks, but those talks are going nowhere, and should not reasonably be expected to go anywhere.

All this is worse than disturbing: it is disgusting, as is the world community’s failure to act in response. There have been one or two verbal condemnations, and the imposition of economic sanctions which will hurt the people worse than they hurt the government; but nothing was done to stop the violence while it was ongoing. This seems to fit a pattern of inaction by the world community in the face of blatant ongoing crimes against humanity. In keeping with the general rule of thumb proposed above, I believe that by using violence to retain power, Mugabe’s government has lost any claim to legitimacy: it is now unquestionably a dictatorship, not a democracy.

Bearing all this in mind I find myself grappling with the question, when is it appropriate to intervene? I feel let down that after decades of ongoing violence the world continues to stand idly by and watch while atrocities are committed in Africa.

Yet any intervention would certainly have let to additional loss of life, even if the long-term result of that intervention was relative stability.

I understand that in its present form the United Nations does not have the necessary authority for rapid response deployment of peacekeeping forces with kill orders; and throughout chapter 3 I advocate changing the UN charter to make sure it will be able to do this in the future. I understand that this is a long-term goal; but it is critical for the well-being of people around the world.

Although such a thing could not be compelled from the outside, I would also advocate a revision of the African Union charter, to make that continent an economically and politically unified community like the European Union and the United States of America. The federalization of Africa could potentially create a more effective local peacekeeping system to safeguard elections processes and to protect civilians from militias. The economic benefits could also help to improve standards of living in one of the poorest regions of the world, a region possessed of a wealth of the world’s biodiversity, a region with a long terrible history of slavery, colonialism, and conflict; a region with a projected future of environmental calamity due to the effects of global climate change.

While calling for amendments to the U.N. and A.U. charters, I continue to struggle with the philosophical question of when intervention is appropriate. At what threshold does a local disturbance become a crime against humanity? How will the international communities recognize such situations early, without impeding the rights of the people? I feel that this threshold was crossed in both of the elections described above, but I have been unable to agree with myself about what mechanism should trigger the deployment of international peacekeeping forces and what specific plan should be followed in such a deployment. I welcome readers’ thoughts on this matter.

Last week it became apparent that the Iraqi government has reached the same conclusion. In order to make our occupation "legal," the elected Iraqi leadership must pass new status of forces legislation essentially inviting us to stay before the United Nations Security Council extension of the mandate of multinational forces expires on December 31, 2008.

On July 8, Mouwaffak al-Rubaie, Iraq’s national security advisor, told reporters that:

We will not accept any memorandum of understanding that doesn’t have specific dates to withdraw foreign forces from Iraq.

It will be interesting to watch Iraq’s US-backed government attempt to assert its independence in the face of US leadership opposed to any withdrawal, much less timetables. President Bush opposes timetables; General David Petraeus opposes timetables; and Presidential candidate Senator John McCain has stated publicly that he expects the Iraq war to last 100 years. Surely McCain and his corporate backers would be terribly disappointed if our military were to leave in only a year or two. I for one am hoping to see McCain with a sad face because his war policy, like the Bush-Cheney policy which it continues, is simply unacceptable.

The analysis found that in the near future global climate change will increase the incidence of poverty, disease, hunger, and water-related disputes, and that these in turn will generate ever growing populations of migrants, illegal aliens, and political and economic refugees. Water and food shortages are projected to become tremendous issues for parts of Asia and Latin America, with a great potential for causing conflict or even destabilizing governments. Furthermore, the assessment projected that such weakened governments will increase the frequency of civil wars, fundamentalist extremism, and reactionary authoritarianism; and, finally, it projects that the United States will be more and more frequently drawn into these situations.

As I outline in section 3.2.2 and reiterate throughout the book, I advocate transferring responsibility for global security to the global body that has the authority to intervene in such situations: the United Nations. The United States is not the appropriate entity for administering the massive long-term security stabilization and infrastructure development projects which will be required to cope with the scale of this growing problem. However I think it is very important to recognize the very real implications which climate change is having and will increasingly have in the future on the security of our world. A self-aware society considers the long-term probabilities and then plans for those eventualities to mitigate potentially disastrous circumstances. In the meantime, the United States must be willing to make economic sacrifices in order to become a signatory to, and implementer of, the various biosphere-related accords and protocols, something our government has resisted. If we are to be a self-aware society we must move quickly to mitigate not only the security implications but the causes of global climate change themselves, by updating our industries, our laws, our global order, and our culture of consciousness.